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In the Winter of my sophomore year at university I began seeing a psychiatrist at the 
insistence of my father, who looked on with distress as, quite unable to sleep, I shed weight at 
the same alarming rate at which my grades dropped, misplaced my lightheartedness and took up 
an uncharacteristically chilling cynicism, and generally seemed more morose than one could 
expect from even a grungy liberal arts student in the gloomiest, greyest corner of the country. 
Upon meeting me, my psychiatrist was quick to prescribe a benzodiazepine for insomnia and a 
medication (which I will refer to as my primary medication, as I took it daily at carefully 
regulated doses) for related health reasons. Early that Summer, several months into my treatment 
plan and feeling much improved, I woke up from a grand mal seizure in a California airport mere 
steps away from boarding a plane out of the state. Dazed and disoriented, I could not recall what 
city we were in nor what year it was. I subsequently spent several hours in the emergency room 
with all sorts of tubes and wires sticking out of me like a broken kitchen appliance, completely 
convinced that the whole drama was a cunning, if uneconomical, conspiracy arranged by my 
significant other to get us off the hook for a missed flight. I had no memory of the incident, but 
was more unsettled by the fact that I woke up a stranger to the world around me. It was an 
uncanny flavor of feeling that I had the pleasure of experiencing once more the following 
September when I found myself back in the urgent care unit after a second seizure. 
Urgent care physicians in the emergency room and psychiatric professionals with whom I 
interacted prior to my seizure differed in their understandings of the event, and their respective 
medical backgrounds resulted in varying diagnoses and prescriptions. Foucault’s theory of 
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medicalization and the biopolitical state aptly uncovers the process by which I came to 
understand myself as a mentally ill patient with abnormal behavioral patterns to be surveilled and 
treated, and to piece apart the therapeutic and dangerous personalities that medication can take 
on within and without professional supervision. More specifically, I aim to understand what 
happens when medications escape the regulatory realms of biopolitical actors and become 
addictive substances subject to unregulated consumption. What are the structures in place to deal 
with these misalignments in state disciplinary technology? What are the limits of state power, 
and what are the dangers of dismissing the personalities and subjectivities of patients? To 
explore the latter query, I borrow from Lisa Stevenson’s 2014 analysis of biopolitical regimes of 
anonymous care that statisticalize Inuit people. She writes about the ways the Canadian state 
erases individual Inuit identities and instead quantitatively measures its success in its mission to 
regulate the mortality of the Inuit population as a single entity. Kleinman’s work demonstrates 
how care professionals use limited information to arrive at conclusions about cause and effect 
and analyzes how, despite psychiatry’s own clean alignment with biopolitical regimes of care, 
psychiatric care can serve as a more effective, personalized, and accurate mode of treatment. 
Foucault and Kleinman both define terms that relate to how the psychiatric patient 
experiences regimes of medicalization. Foucault traces the emergence of a biopolitical state, 
contrasting it with the traditional sovereign state. In the biopolitical regime, the state’s power lies 
in its ability “to make live and to let die” (2003, 241). The body becomes the site of discipline 
and regulation, and the population, subjected to increasingly imperceptible and pervasive 
mechanisms of control, becomes the “object of surveillance, analysis, intervention, modification” 
(1980, 171). The perfect health of the people ensures their maximum economic utility and so 
becomes the priority of the state. Foucault argues that the “essential function of society or the 
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State, or whatever it is that must replace the State, is to take control of life, to manage it, 
compensate for its aleatory nature, to explore and reduce biological accidents and possibilities” 
(2003, 261). The burden of health management is in part transferred to the people themselves, 
who take up the biopolitical ideology and reproduce it as their own. Health is “at once the duty 
of each and the objective of all” (1980, 170). Various social institutions are absorbed into this 
framework in a process Foucault calls medicalization, whereby increasingly remote corners of 
human social and personal life come to be understood as issues of health and medicine. In his 
work on the culture of care in the Western medical tradition, Arthur Kleinman (1995) brings 
Foucault into conversation when he asserts that “biomedicine is not just any bureaucracy and 
profession, it is a leading institution of industrialized society’s management of social reality[…] 
This process of medicalization is responsible for certain of biomedicine’s most controversial 
attributes. Biomedicine’s sector of influence continues to grow as more and more life problems 
are brought under its aegis” (38). 
A patient's experience of medicalization is further indicated by personal content found on 
apps such as Moodtracker. The patient, with her mental illness diagnosis and subsequent 
prescription, takes on a new understanding of herself: an understanding of her emotions and 
behaviors as symptoms, of her mental disposition as biologically diseased, of her environment as 
potentially triggering or as therapeutic. The patient’s emotive and cognitive self comes to be 
conceptualized and described, both self-referentially and by authorities, using clinical, well-
defined terms, listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and 
legitimized by an extensive bibliography of scientific studies and trials. She learns to attend to 
her emotions in a new, careful, conscious way, sorting them into ambivalent categories of 
natural, authentic, human, and healthy; or triggered, diseased, extreme, unreasonable, 
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unauthorized, and therefore not of the authentic self, a self which emerges when the psyche is 
chemically balanced through a prescribed medicinal regimen. 
 But how does one achieve balance, a stable baseline, when normality is a notion just as 
subjective as that of pain? I examined content on Moodtracker in an attempt to piece apart some 
common definition of normality among individuals. Moodtracker allows users to create 
anonymous, public “diaries” where they post entries that have a title, body, and rating of mood (a 
rainbow scale from one red star for “Worst” to five yellow stars for “Best”). Mood ratings are 
arranged in a visual chart that tracks shifts in mood across time, allowing patients to analyze 
emotional patterns, trends, and progress. Intuitively, three blue stars would seem to indicate a 
baseline mood or some measure of normality. However, the kind of entries marked as three-star 
moods varied hugely. Some users would describe feeling down, depressed, overwhelmed, or 
anxious, while others wrote about feelings of euphoria, fulfillment, even extreme and 
inexplicable happiness. Similarly, how people calibrated other ratings provided insight into the 
deeply subjective formulations of emotional health. Some might use five-star labels exclusively 
to describe exceptional elation, while others would attach it to entries where they simply share 
that it was a fine day. What might be marked as a four-star mood for one might be marked a two-
star mood for others. 
These observations led me to believe that there is little clear consensus for a definition of 
normality in mental health. Indeed, in psychiatric situations patients are often expected to reach 
an understanding of “what feels right.” Definitions of illness are complicated by a measure of 
ambivalence despite their careful documentation in the DSM. Is an antidepressant doing its job if 
the patient no longer feels sad, but in fact feels very little at all, even numb? Or if the patient is 
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not anxious, but experiences increased lethargy and sleepiness? Are side effects sometimes just 
an inconvenient but inescapable fact of medication? 
As the patient is taught what does and does not qualify her as mentally unwell, she begins 
to surveil and report her behaviors. The types of questions asked at psychiatric appointments 
(What did you eat today? How have you been sleeping? Are you getting your work done?) train 
her to be attentive to certain patterns in her daily life. The patient is made responsible for 
tracking and documenting behaviors as symptoms, knowing she will have to report them 
retrospectively in the thorough interrogations that characterize her meetings with the practitioner. 
Here, she becomes complicit in the very regimes of surveillance that form the biopolitical state. 
She monitors her dietary consumption, sleep patterns, hygiene, sociability, energy levels, ability 
to focus, and academic performance—seemingly all aspects of waking (and sleeping, for that 
matter) life are medicalized. The patient willingly and unconsciously becomes a perfect secretary 
of the state. Following Foucault, one finds that the diagnostic methodology of psychiatry 
requires “a politico-medical hold on a population hedged in by a whole series of prescriptions 
relating not only to disease but to general forms of existence and behavior (food and drink, 
sexuality and fecundity, clothing and the layout of living space” (1980, 176). 
While I argue psychiatry trains individuals to surveil and police their own bodies, I mean 
to make it clear that this is not necessarily always a negative quality. It serves to build a largely 
well-informed profile of the patient for a physician aiming to provide highly personalized and 
contextualized care. This form of treatment appears all the more laudable when juxtaposed with 
the work performed by urgent care physicians constrained by time and instilled with values of 
efficiency, professional distance, and skepticism of poorly informed patients. When I found 
myself in the urgent care unit in June, I was tended to by a nurse who asked a series of questions 
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about my own and my family’s medical history, my consumption of alcohol and illicit drugs, and 
my mental and physical state on the day of the event. In this interaction, I found Kleinman to be 
quite accurate in his claim that “the rule of efficiency governs the lived time of the patient-
practitioner encounter” (1995, 37). Here, Lisa Stevenson’s work (2014) on anonymous care also 
provides an insightful theoretical tool for piecing apart the differences between care by 
psychiatrists and medical care by physicians in the urgent care unit. 
After several hours spent waiting for lab results regarding my seizure to come back (none 
of the results were outstanding), a doctor came in briefly to speak with me. He asserted that my 
medication had likely reduced my seizure threshold and made me more susceptible to the more 
severe side effects of alcohol hangovers and benzodiazepine withdrawals. He went on to suggest 
I take my benzodiazepine more regularly, predicting that if I had taken that medication the night 
before, I might have avoided the seizure entirely. At this point in my medication course I had 
been taking the drug very infrequently. The physician felt, however, that the seizure may have 
been the result not only of a heavy night of drinking to celebrate my twenty-first birthday, but of 
benzodiazepine withdrawals as well. He insisted that I take my prescription that night and every 
night thereafter. As the sheriff of my body and secretary for the state, there was the implication 
that I was irresponsible in my irregular consumption of a prescription and therefore responsible 
for the incident. The World Health Organization reports on their international website on mental 
health that “[depression] treatment should be regularly monitored, with special attention to 
treatment adherence” (World Health Organization). This mandate speaks to Foucault’s 
observation that the biopolitical state fosters, at both institutional and familial levels, “a dense, 
saturated, permanent, continuous physical environment which envelopes, maintains and develops 
the child’s body (1980, 172-173). 
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The suggestion by the urgent care physician to take the sleep aid more regularly, despite a 
very superficial understanding of my treatment course and my general mental health, serves as 
an apt example of medical practitioners turning to medication in the face of problems with 
medication. As Kleinman points out, “it is not surprising then, that therapeutic hubris is 
commonplace. Physicians are not educated to… place limits on the utilization of powerful 
technologies” (1995, 34). He continues, “an institutionally efficient technical fix (a drug) can be 
applied in place of a humanly significant relationship of witnessing, affirming, and engaging the 
patient’s and family’s existential experience,” (1995: 36) speaking to the prioritization of 
scientifically grounded professionalism over a personalized, attentive understanding of mental 
illness. 
Stevenson would add that in the name of efficiency and in the attempt to maximize the 
number of individuals made to live, physicians accomplish this institutionalized distancing by 
engaging in a statistical, depersonalized, and population-oriented understanding of the patient. 
For the physician, I existed as a unit of a published figure (0.1%) enumerating the very small 
population of people who have experienced seizures as a result of my primary medication and 
also as a member of a population known more widely to be at risk for seizures from 
benzodiazepine withdrawals (Rissmiller 2007). The physician reached the conclusion that I was 
more likely part of the latter group by looking at my medical history, which stated that I had 
been taking a sleep aid for several months, and I was on a relatively small dose of my primary 
medication at the time. He knew that abrupt cessation of benzodiazepines could result in 
dangerous and well-documented side-effects, including seizures, and so fixated on my identity as 
a segment of that at-risk population (Petursson 1994). 
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With both my psychiatrist and the emergency room physicians engaged in a 
“reconstruction of the person appropriate to the medical gaze” (Good 1994, 73), my 
psychiatrist’s careful and meticulous monitoring of my treatment proved to construct a much 
more effective model for treatment. She knew that I was taking a benzodiazepine irregularly and 
in small doses. In our conversations, she came to understand the environmental factors that were 
linked to my health issues and so recognized when I was more or less likely to need the 
medication. Aware that I was out of school enjoying the first liberating, stress-free weeks of 
summer, she knew I had less reason to take the medication at this particular point in time. 
Moreover, weeks before, she had given me a combinatorial pharmacogenomic enzyme test to 
learn which medications were compatible with my gut flora. We found that my primary 
medication was on the list of substances with a moderate gene-drug interaction. She proceeded 
with her original treatment plan, explaining that these kinds of biological tests were far from 
comprehensive and were occasionally inaccurate. But when she heard about my seizure, this data 
provided her with the groundwork for developing an individualized diagnosis. Her intimate 
knowledge of both my social and biological lives led her to an entirely different analysis of 
the seizure’s onset than that of the emergency room doctor, whose name and face I can’t recall 
and who was neither privy to nor interested in any of that information. In contrast with 
psychiatrists, physicians do not often address environmental factors as causes of mental upset 
and sources of trauma, but instead categorize social and cultural factors as symptomatic; 
reactions to the environment are assessed as problematic, unusual, or indicative of biological 
deviations. 
With my second seizure, which had no apparent cause and could not be attributed to 
careless use of a prescription, the physician prescribed an anti-seizure medication. In both 
Freda 
 9 
instances, the physician’s first impulse was to increase medication. Neither doctor suggested I 
decrease my dosage of my primary medication, though I explained that it had been found to be 
incompatible with my body. In their eyes, I should continue to take a prescription even if it meant 
the addition of another to offset side effects. The authority of the initial prescription, which had 
been mandated by a fellow—and therefore trusted—medical professional was much stronger 
than my own authority. This falls in line with Kleinman’s analysis that “the patient’s and 
family’s complaints are regarded as subjective self-reports, biased accounts of a too-personal 
somewhere,” (1995, 32) while “expert judgment is further legitimated over and against that of 
the generalist and the layperson” (1995: 38). For Foucault, this represents an instance in which 
“the doctor wins a footing within the different instances of social power” (1980, 176). 
Emergency room personnel were not able to provide the kind of empathetic, well-
informed relationships of care advocated by Kleinman; the advice and treatment that I received 
were misleading and potentially dangerous. My psychiatrist ultimately determined that my 
primary medication was the cause of the seizures, and we began to wean me off the drugs. 
Meanwhile, I had been following the initial physician’s advice and was taking my secondary 
medication, the benzodiazepine, nightly, though my psychiatrist was alarmed when she learned 
this, chiding me about the dangerous interactions that could occur between the two substances in 
an already vulnerable nervous system. Kleinman’s work allows us to assess the limits of care that 
can be provided by physicians operating in a framework of hubris and sterile insensitivity. My 
experiences demonstrated that the treatment by physicians was not nearly of the same substance 
as that provided by my psychiatrist, whose approach to care was highly personalized and deeply 
probing. How do we reckon with a psychiatry that simultaneously depends upon a deeply 
personalized, intimate understanding of a vulnerable patient and upon a hierarchical, professional 
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authorization of cognitive and bodily symptoms? What are the merits and dangers of the self-
conscious medicalization of one’s own body and behavior according to arbitrary standards 
enacted by a biopolitical network of medical authorities? 
Medications can escape the grasp of the biopolitical state, a sterile regime of 
biomedicine, and take up animate personalities of their own. What role does addiction play, as 
the quintessential manifestation of un-regulation, outside the realm of disciplinary powers? On 
Moodtracker one finds many accounts of addiction to prescribed psychiatric drugs, most notably 
benzodiazepines. These medications, which some might argue serve as state mechanisms of 
control, develop chaotic personalities and become themselves uncontrollable, like a pair of 
handcuffs tangled unto itself or a traffic light that flickers. In this instance, the biopolitical state 
seemed to not facilitate enough regulatory power. But this may not exemplify a failure of a state 
that, in collaboration with pharmaceutical industries, demonstrates a vested interest in cultivating 
certain forms of addiction; instead, it may serve a function to let die those who cannot be made 
to live (Rose 2001). We are left again attempting to grapple with a biopolitical regime that is able 
to obtain much of the information it desires and direct behavior in many regions of society, but 
reveals fractured regulatory power when its structures of disciplinary control do not align with 
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